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Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competitiveness 
Surveillance:  
What solutions to what problems? 
Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi 
 
lose coordination of national fiscal policy and 
surveillance of competitiveness seem highly 
desirable within a monetary union. But are they 
also feasible? This note argues that surveillance of 
competitiveness risks concentrating on symptoms 
(rising wages in the non-tradable sector), rather than 
the underlying causes (credit-financed booms). 
Moreover, the economic rationale for fiscal policy 
coordination (beyond the strict enforcement of the 
Stability and Growth Pact – SGP) seems to be weak 
during normal times. While it makes sense to 
coordinate the fiscal response of member states to the 
present crisis, it does not seem appropriate to develop 
new permanent mechanisms for the coordination of 
national fiscal policy. 
1. Introduction 
In June 2010, both the European Commission
1 and the 
European Central Bank
2 published documents 
containing ideas for enhancing European economic 
governance. Both proposals stress the need for stronger 
surveillance on a country-by-country basis and the 
                                                      
1 European Commission (2010), Enhancing economic policy 
coordination for stability, growth and jobs – Tools for 
stronger EU economic governance, Communication from 
the European Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council and the European Central 
Bank, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Brussels, June.  
2 European Central Bank (2010), Reinforcing economic 
governance in the euro area, June. 
effective enforcement of surveillance through 
incentives and a wider spectrum of sanctions. 
There are two main differences between the two 
proposals: i) the ECB envisages the creation of an 
independent fiscal agency while the Commission 
would keep the surveillance task under its mandate, 
and ii) while the ECB focuses on fiscal policy and 
competitiveness surveillance, the Commission’s 
proposal considers broader macroeconomic 
surveillance aimed at the early identification of 
macroeconomic imbalances.
3 The official reports refer 
only to ‘harmful’ imbalances, without ever providing a 
definition of what is harmful. The key underlying 
problem is whether a large surplus could also be 
considered a ‘harmful’ imbalance. 
Macroeconomic imbalances could be external and 
internal, symmetric or asymmetric and are associated 
with a wide range of economic indicators, e.g. current 
account (im-)balance, net foreign asset position, real 
effective exchange rate, asset prices and government 
debt among others. This implies that any surveillance 
of macroeconomic imbalances would entail a far-
reaching inspection of the economic situation of each 
member country. No single indicator would appear to 
be sufficient to warrant a finding of ‘harmful 
macroeconomic imbalance’. 
                                                      
3 The proposals of the ECB and the Commission also differ 
in their approach to reinforcing the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) and fiscal discipline, but these aspects are not 
considered here. 
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The Commission’s proposal also includes a specific 
tool to enhance fiscal policy coordination, the so-called 
‘European semester’.  
We argue in this paper that while there are valid 
arguments for fiscal policy coordination, but that the 
potential welfare gains should not be overstated – at 
least under normal circumstances. 
Moreover, while there has certainly been a dangerous 
divergence in competitiveness among member 
countries, this should be considered as a symptom of 
divergences in other factors (domestic demand) rather 
than an independent cause that could be cured simply 
by direct policy intervention.  
Section 1 below focuses on the analysis of fiscal policy 
coordination in a common currency area under special 
circumstance and section 2 argues that changes in 
competitiveness tend to be endogenous and hence 
largely outside of policy control. 
2.  National fiscal policy and a common 
currency 
The limitations of the euro area’s framework for fiscal 
policy are well known and have been debated for 
years. Since it had been accepted from the start of 
EMU that fiscal policy had to remain a national 
responsibility, there could at most be some voluntary 
coordination of national fiscal policies, ideally 
intermediated through the meetings of finance 
ministers of the euro area, the so-called Eurogroup. 
According to official rhetoric, the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) provided a sufficient framework for the 
coordination of fiscal policy. 
From a strictly economic point of view, one could 
argue that under ordinary circumstances the case for 
fiscal policy coordination within the eurozone is 
actually quite weak because the international spill-
overs of fiscal policy are of uncertain sign and 
magnitude. Under ordinary circumstances, a fiscal 
expansion in any one country has two effects on its 
partners: a positive one as it increases demand for 
imports, and a negative one as a fiscal expansion puts 
pressure on euro area interest rates, which will tend to 
lower demand in the entire area.
4 Under ordinary 
circumstances the net spill-over effect of a fiscal 
expansion in any one member country is thus likely to 
be small. It could be positive or negative, depending 
on the relative size of the direct demand channel (itself 
a function of the importance of trade flows) and the 
interest channel (depending on the structure of 
financial markets). Following this argument, national 
                                                      
4 See Belke & Gros (2009). 
governments could have interest in seeing that fiscal 
coordination does not happen. 
Under ordinary circumstances, it is thus difficult to 
argue that closer fiscal policy coordination would yield 
large welfare gains. 
However, under present, special, circumstances, the 
interest rate is effectively very close to the lower 
bound, and the interest channel mentioned above 
seems to have lost its importance. The euro area is not 
yet in a classic liquidity trap that renders monetary 
policy ineffective, but it is clear that interest rates and 
central bank liquidity injection are no longer the main 
factor affecting the availability of credit.
5 The official 
interest rate has been at 1% since May 2009, and, as 
shown in Figure 1, while M1 has been increasing 
rapidly since the beginning of the crisis, loans to 
households and non-financial enterprises have been at 
best stable or even declining. 
This whole situation implies that under the present, 
special circumstances, since the interest rate channel 
does not work, the spill-overs from fiscal policy are 
going to be unambiguously positive. And they are 
potentially quite large according to macroeconomic 
theory, which suggests that fiscal policy multipliers are 
larger under the hypothesis that agents are liquidity 
constrained because they are likely to spend, rather 
than save any additional unit of income they receive 
and the number of constrained agents increases in 
times of economic recession.  
However if national policy-makers do not recognise 
the unambiguous positive spill-overs, fiscal policy 
could be insufficiently expansive. This is the reason 
why theory would predict that in the absence of policy 
coordination, aggregate fiscal policy could be too 
restrictive in the aftermath of a financial crisis. This 
consideration constitutes a simple justification of the 
initiative taken by the Commission in December 2008 
to coordinate a joint fiscal policy response to the 
developing recession (whose severity was only 
gradually becoming apparent). This so-called 
European Recovery Programme was duly endorsed by 
the European Council a few days later. 
 
 
                                                      
5 This does not mean that the ECB not play an important 
role. On the contrary, the extraordinary measures used by 
the ECB are vital for the European interbank system or at 
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Figure 1. Monetary policy and credit availability  
 
Note: Loans includes loans to non-financial corporation and households. 
Source: ECB (Statistical Warehouse). 
 
This episode might have constituted an example of 
how fiscal coordination should work. Looking ahead, 
however, the key question is whether the euro area (or 
the entire EU) needs a tighter permanent framework 
for fiscal policy coordination (besides the SGP). As 
stated earlier, however, this does not seem to be the 
case during ‘normal times’. Therefore, it does not seem 
advisable to create new permanent mechanisms for 
fiscal policy coordination. There is a significant risk 
that it would become irrelevant as soon as the effects 
of the crisis have worn off. 
3.  A misguided fixation on 
competitiveness 
The President of the European Central Bank is said to 
show at each meeting of the European Council a graph 
depicting the evolution of relative wage costs across 
the 16 member countries of the euro area. The charts 
used by J-C Trichet and many others almost invariably 
use the start of EMU as the base year. These standard 
measures of competitiveness suggest that the countries 
now in difficulties (Spain, Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal) have over the last ten years lost 
competitiveness by around 20% relative to Germany. 
In other words, since 1999, wage costs have increased 
by about 20% less in Germany than elsewhere in 
peripheral Europe. The conclusion seems to be 
straightforward: the southern euro area members have 
to reduce their wage costs to claw back the loss of 
competitiveness since the start of EMU. 
The concern about divergences has also reached not 
only the ECB and the European Commission, as 
mentioned earlier, but also the Task Force under EU 
President Herman Van Rompuy that is supposed to 
come up with fundamental reforms to the rules for 
economic policy coordination within the EU. A key 
proposal at the first meeting of this Task Force was to 
develop competitiveness indicators and then force 
member countries to take 'remedial action' should the 
EU find large divergences in the indicators. A similar 
approach is indicated in the documents of the ECB and 
the European Commission. However, this approach 
risks leading policy-makers in the wrong direction. 
A first point is obviously that competitiveness, usually 
measured as relative unit labour costs, is a relative 
concept. The gain of one country means a loss of 
another. The logical conclusion would be that if one 
wants to restore the competitiveness of some member 
countries (e.g. Spain, Greece), others (Germany in the 
first instance) must accept a deterioration in theirs: the 
adjustment might come about either through wage 
increases in the lower labour costs or cuts in the 
countries with too high costs.  There is some consensus 
among officials that no country should be forced to 
increase wages and everybody gains if structural 
reforms increase productivity. The latter is certainly 
true, but it does not solve the fundamental fact that the 
relative unit labour costs of a country goes down if 
those of another countries go up.  
A second point is that it is always difficult to 
determine the proper base year. It is implicitly often 
assumed that the start of EMU is the best base, but this 
does not seem to be the case. Figure 2 shows the 
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countries, but to eliminate the bias induced by the 
choice of the year base, the index (as provided by the 
ECB) has been re-scaled, dividing it by its average 
over the period 1995-2010.  
Interestingly the figure shows the existence of a node 
in 2003 rather than in 1999-2000. This highlights the 
fact that 1999-2000, which is usually taken as the base 
year, might not have been an equilibrium itself. 2003, 
appears to be year of the smallest cross-country 
differences if one takes the long-term average as the 
equilibrium concept. Prior to 2003, Germany seems to 
have been ‘uncompetitive’ and after 2003, some 
countries like Ireland and Spain, where bubbles started 
to emerge, experienced a significant loss in 
competitiveness. Choosing the base period carefully is 
important. Most analysis that use 1999-2000 as the 
base conclude that the countries now in difficulties 
have lost about 25-30% in terms of unit labour costs 
relative to Germany. Using 2003 as the base year 
yields a substantially smaller estimate of the 
divergence, namely about 15%. The purpose of these 
simple considerations was not to show that 2003 is 
unambiguously the proper base year, but simply to 
show how difficult it becomes in practice to measure 
divergences in competitiveness.  
 
 
Figure 2. Real harmonised competitiveness indicator unit labour cost (ULC) in total economy deflated 
 
Note: ECB EER-21 group of currencies and Euro area 16 country currencies (FR, BE, LU, NL, DE, IT, IE, PT, ES, FI, AT, GR, 
SI, AU, CA, CN, DK, HK, JP, NO, SG, KR, SE, CH, GB, US, CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, SK, BG, RO) 
To get rid of the year-base bias, the original index has been re-scaled by using its long-term (1995-2010) average. 
Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse and own computation. 
 
Moreover, there is some evidence that the divergences 
of the competitiveness indicators today constitute a 
mirror image of the divergences that existed during the 
early 1990s. 
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the competitiveness 
indicator of euro area member countries in 1995 and in 
2010.  It is apparent that there is a strong correlation 
between the two. Countries that had a high labour cost 
indicator (notably Germany and Austria) in 1994 have 
experience a strong increase in competitiveness (a fall 
in their relative unit labour costs) and those countries 
with the best position in 1994 now have the highest 
cost. Baldwin at al. (2010) argue the ‘imbalances’ that 
appeared within the eurozone over the first decade of 
EMU were mainly due to the basic asymmetry that 
German unification introduced into the European 
economy at the start of the 1990s. The implication of 
this analysis is that the next decade might well bring a 
swing of the pendulum back towards equilibrium.  
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Figure 3. Unit labour costs in 1995 and in 2010  
 
Note: ECB EER-21 group of currencies and euro area 16 country currencies (FR, BE, LU, NL, DE, IT, IE, PT, ES, FI, AT, GR, 
SI, AU, CA, CN, DK, HK, JP, NO, SG, KR, SE, CH, GB, US, CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, SK, BG, RO) 
As in Figure 2, the original ULC index has been re-scaled by using its long-term (1995-2010) average. 
Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse and own computation. 
 
Even assuming that an agreement within the euro area 
can be found on how to assign the desired future losses 
and gains in competitiveness across countries, one has 
to keep in mind that member countries are not 
centrally planned economies. There is little 
government can do in a market economy to force 
lower wages in the private sector. Governments can of 
course enforce wage cuts in the public sector. This is 
being done on a large scale in Greece and Spain, for 
example. But there is little empirical evidence that 
public sector wages have a economically significant 
impact on wage growth in the private sector.
6 
So which one is the way forward? The natural answer 
is higher productivity. However, even assuming that 
governments were able to find the structural reforms 
that yield quick increases in productivity, it is not 
always clear that higher productivity leads to increased 
competitiveness.
7 The opposite often holds across the 
EU: some of the countries that had the highest growth 
                                                      
6 See ECB (2009) and Lamo et al. (2008) for empirical 
studies, which find econometrically significant effects, but 
the orders of magnitude remain so small that any politically 
feasible autonomous change in public wages would have 
only a negligible impact on private sector wages. 
7 EU cross-country data on competitiveness and productivity 
do not show any significant positive correlation. 
in labour productivity were also the ones that lost the 
most competitiveness. How can these two facts be 
reconciled? After all, higher productivity should bring 
lower unit labour costs.  
There are at least two possible explanations. The first 
is that an increase in productivity tends to be sector-
specific, and the tradable sector tends to perform better 
in terms of productivity than the non-tradable sector. 
Following a standard Balassa-Samuelson argument, 
increases in productivity in the tradable sector that 
justify increases in wages in that sector can result in a 
loss of competitiveness of the country as whole by 
inducing a wage increase also in the non-tradable 
sector, especially if the non-tradable sector is large. In 
fact, the competitiveness indicator for surveillance is 
for the whole economy. 
The second explanation is that improvements in 
productivity are easily overwhelmed by changes in 
wages: improvements in productivity growth are 
already large if they consist of fractions of a 
percentage point while wage increases are of a much 
larger magnitude. 
So the real question is: what drives wages? Country-
level data suggest that the largest increase in wages are 
in general associated with the strongest increase in 
domestic demand over the last decade (e.g. Spain, 
Greece).  6 | Gros & Alcidi 
But what is the chicken and what is the egg here? Are 
wages driving demand or vice versa? Most of the loss 
of competitiveness in peripheral Europe arose once 
unemployment there had been much reduced. The 
measured loss of competitiveness in peripheral Europe 
over the last decade should thus not be ascribed to a 
lack of structural reforms or unreasonable trade unions, 
but rather to booms in domestic demand, fuelled 
mainly by the easy availability of cheap credit for 
consumption (Greece) and construction (Spain, 
Ireland). This excessive consumption and construction 
demand led to an excess demand for labour, especially 
in the protected sectors (e.g. services), thus driving up 
wage costs. 
Viewing competitiveness as an endogenous 
‘symptom’, rather than an autonomous factor has two 
implications: 
1)  If excessive domestic demand was the problem, 
the solution should now be on its way. 
International capital markets have already curtailed 
credit to these countries. The sharp fiscal 
retrenchment that has now started throughout 
peripheral Europe should contribute further to a 
sharp deceleration, maybe even outright fall, in 
domestic demand in these countries. If labour 
markets are flexible, this should result in lower 
wages. This is the key condition: flexibility of 
labour markets on the way down as much as on the 
way up. Adjustment in the deficit countries would 
of course be much easier if wages were to increase 
in Germany. But this might happen soon since 
unemployment is actually going down in Germany 
and, given that in the past, wages in Germany have 
tended to increase (moderately) when 
unemployment remained low. 
2)  The appropriate policy response to a loss of 
competitiveness (which is judged to be ‘harmful’) 
should be to focus on domestic demand, not on 
wage developments or specific aspects of the 
labour market. In the case of Spain, for example, it 
would have been necessary to restrain the pace of 
housing construction (e.g. by auctioning off only a 
limited number of building permits), rather than 
trying to meddle with the labour market in the 
midst of a domestic demand boom.  
The proposition that governments ‘need to do 
something about competitiveness’ might lead to an 
excessively activist approach to economic policy 
coordination under which governments and the EU 
institutions constantly try to influence wage-setting in 
the private sector. This might work partially in the 
present crisis situation (e.g. in Greece, Spain), but will 
not be able to prevent future divergences in 
competitiveness if domestic demand diverges again. 
Structural reforms are always useful, but increasing 
productivity takes a long time and does not always 
translate into higher competitiveness.  
What is needed in southern Europe is the acceptance 
that domestic demand has to fall to a level that allows 
the country to live without further capital inflows. 
Once this is done, it should be sufficient to allow 
labour markets to work until the system finds its new 
equilibrium. 
4. Conclusions 
Avoiding ‘harmful’ macroeconomic imbalances is of 
course desirable. However, no official document has 
ever spelt out how one would determine that an 
existing imbalance is ‘harmful’ (to whom?). In reality 
what is meant by the reference to ‘harmful imbalances’ 
is that – ex post – it is clear that the Southern European 
euro area members would today be better off if they 
had somehow maintained a more competitiveness 
position and kept their external deficits lower. Large 
external deficits always put a country in a delicate 
position when there is a ‘sudden stop’ to the capital 
inflows. Experience has shown that this can happened 
even within a monetary union and that such ‘sudden 
stops’ can create dangerous dislocations in financial 
markets with effects on the entire euro area. There is 
thus an economic case to be made for avoiding the 
build-up of large deficits that might create difficulties 
Europe if financial markets stop financing them. 
However, the best policy response seems not to place a 
narrow focus on competitiveness indicators, but rather 
on the prevention of underlying causes of the 
imbalance, which are usually divergences in domestic 
demand (often driven by credit-financed real estate 
and/or consumption booms). 
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